Introduction
Provision for bad debt or loan loss provision, hereafter LLP, is a deduction from bank net interest income to cover expected credit losses on bank loan portfolio. Bank regulators continue to stress that loan loss provision should be sufficient to minimize loan loss on bank loan portfolio. However, emerging empirical studies suggests that bank managers may have other incentive(s) to influence or manipulate reported loan loss provision estimates other than mitigating expected credit loss. Though standard setters emphasize transparency in the measurement of provisioning estimates to avoid opportunistic managerial behaviour, studies find that banks may influence LLP to reduce the variability of income (income smoothing), manage regulatory capital, and signal loan quality. Also, studies in the banking literature, argue that bad debt provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle. They argue that banks delay provisions until it is too late. The effect of the 2008 financial crisis has raised debates among regulators and academics about IFRS's backward looking provisioning model.
Motivated by these concerns and the voluntary adoption of IFRS reporting among commercial banks in
Nigeria, I examine whether bank managers influence LLP to smooth income, manage capital, signal loan quality and whether provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle during the voluntary adoption of IFRS. Furthermore, I test for joint motivations in the pre-and post-crisis period and IFRS period. First, I
predict and find strong evidence for income smoothing in the post IFRS period after controlling for Basel capital regulation. Second, I predict and find strong evidence that banks use LLP to manage regulatory (Tier 1) capital to avoid violating regulatory capital requirements. Third, I find evidence for signaling in the IFRS period. Based on further test, I find evidence that managers may have joint motivations for influencing loan loss provision estimates. Finally, I predict and find that banks delay provisions until a recession materializes.
First, this paper contributes to the accounting choice literature which suggest that managers have various incentives for choosing and influencing some accounting numbers, in this case, loan loss provisions.
Second, this paper contributes to the recent literature in favour of the debate to improve the current IFRS provisioning model which is highly criticized for its inherent procyclical pattern. Third, this paper contributes to the banking literature on bank capital adequacy. The literature argues that strong capital buffers ensure that bank capital is sufficient to absorb unexpected losses and external shocks. I find that banks use LLP as a form of capital which can be increased (decreased) when capital is low (high). Fourth, this paper is the first to examine income smoothing, earnings management, signaling and procyclicality of LLP in Nigeria. I provide a developing country evidence for the concerns raised about the validity of IFRS's current provisioning model. By employing recent bank data, inferences based on the result may inform financial reporting policies. Finally, this empirical evidence contributes to the current debate that criticizes the recent mandatory implementation of IFRS by the Central bank of Nigeria in 2012.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the empirical literature and develops the hypotheses based on the literature review. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

LLP and earnings management
Earlier studies documents evidence for earnings management using LLP (Ma, 1988; Hasan and Hunter, 1994; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Hasan and Wall, 2003) . Also, the recent literature provide evidence for income smoothing. For example, Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) found that banks use discretionary LLP to smooth income but not to signal private information. Anandarajan et al. (2007) show that publicly traded commercial banks in Australia engage in earnings management practices. Perez et al. (2008) found evidence for income smoothing using 142 Spanish banks from 1986 to 2002. Leventis et al. (2012) , using a sample of 91 EU banks, found that income smoothing is more pronounced among risky banks but this smoothing behaviour is less aggressive after implementation of IFRS. In a US study, El Sood (2012) found strong evidence for income smoothing. Balbao et al. (2013) , using 9442 US banks from 1999 to 2008, found evidence for income smoothing but suggest that this relationship may be driven by non-linear patterns. Curcio and Hassan (2013) find strong evidence for income smoothing among non-EU credit institutions. They report that EU firms within markets with high protection of creditor right do not smooth income. On the other hand, some studies show conflicting evidence (for example, Wetmore and Brick, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999) . Ahmed et al. (1999) found no evidence to support the income smoothing hypothesis after the implementation of Basel 1. Overall, the literature documents more positive evidence of smoothing via LLP. Therefore, consistent with these studies, I hypothesize that there is a positive relation between LLP and pre-tax and pre-provision earnings in the post-IFRS period. This follows the reasoning that when bank profits is abnormally high (low) banks tend to increase (decrease) LLP either to minimize the volatility of earnings or to avoid regulatory scrutiny (Wall and Koch, 2000) . Thus,
H1: A positive relation exist between LLP and pre-tax and pre-provision earnings in the post IFRS
period.
LLP and signaling
Managers tend to signal private information about their firm to reduce information asymmetry and to communicate positive inside information to investors (Akerlof, 1970) . The literature reports a positive relation between stock returns and abnormal LLPs and a negative relation between normal LLP and stock returns, suggesting that investors perceive LLP as a tool used to signal private information about future firm performance (Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al. 1997) . After controlling for nondiscretionary changes in LLP, Wahlen (1994) found a positive relation between discretionary provisions and stock returns and future cash flow which suggest that investors interpret abnormal provisions as a signal of good news rather than as a signal of bad news (high expected credit losses). Liu et al. (1997) reports that investors interpret high LLP as good news when banks are experiencing default problems.
Also, they showed that banks, with low regulatory capital ratio in the fourth fiscal year, had positive stock market reaction following unexpected increase in LLP. Kanagaretnam et al. (2005) found that the propensity to signal private information is positively related to the degree of information asymmetry and To develop the signaling hypothesis, Wahlen (1994) suggests that LLP will contain some positive signal about loan quality after controlling for other non-discretionary indicators of loan default such as changes 
LLP and regulatory capital management
Prior studies suggest that, to avoid the cost associated with violating capital regulatory requirements, bank tend to manage regulatory capital using LLP (Whalen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999) . These studies argue that banks tend to increase (decrease) LLP when regulatory capital is low (high) (Moyer, 1990; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Wall and Koch, 2000) . For example, Moyer (1990) finds that managers adjust the timing of LLP to avoid violating bank capital limit. Beatty et al. (1995) argue that LLP influences loan quality and capital management decisions. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (1999) found evidence that banks use LLP to manage capital adequacy ratios to avoid violating minimum capital requirement. Anandarajan et al. (2007) found evidence to support the capital management hypothesis. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), investigating the pro-cyclical behavior for 186 European banks, found that banks with low capital use LLP to manage regulatory capital. On the other hand, some country-specific studies find no evidence to support the capital management hypothesis (Perez et al. 2008; Leventis et al., 2011) . Leventis et al. (2011) , using a sample of 91 banks found no evidence for capital management after the implementation of IFRS.
After the convergence to Basel capital regulation in Nigeria immediately after the crisis, there were costs associated with violating minimum capital requirement. If the cost of violation is perceived to be severe, bank managers may have an incentive to influence regulatory capital ratio via LLP. This is consistent with Ahmed et al. (1999) and Wall and Koch (2000) . This incentive will be greater if banks view LLP as a form of capital. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H3: A negative relation between LLP and Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio in the post-IFRS period.
LLP and Procyclicality
Studies report that LLP is negatively related to the business cycle measured by GDP growth rate (Arpa et al., 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Perez et al., 2006; Floro, 2010; Packer and Zhu, 2012) . Laeven and Majnoni (2002) found that banks delay provisioning until it is too late, suggesting procyclical LLP behaviour. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) 
Methodology
Data and sample selection
The dataset employed in this study were extracted from bank financial statement and World Bank which gives a total of 120 bank-year observations. This period is sufficient enough to capture economic downturn and upturns, financial crisis as well as alternative regulatory regimes (IFRS and Basel).
Model Specification
To test the three hypotheses -income smoothing, regulatory capital and signaling, I adopt a modified model derived from existing models in the literature (Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan, et al., 2007; and Leventis et al., 2011) . The modelling of LLP takes the functional form below:
LLP = f [(non-discretionary), (discretionary), (control variables)]
For this study, the econometric model adopted is panel-data regression with fixed effects.
LLPi,t = α1 + α2 NPLi,t + α3 LLPi,t-1 + α4 LOANi,t + α5 EBTPi,t + α6 SIGNi,t + α7 GDPRj,t + α8 SIZEi,t + α9 IFRSj + α10 POSTj + α11 EBTP*IFRSi,t + α12 SIGN*IFRSi,t + α13EBTP*MCAPi,t + α14TRC*EBTPi,t + α15TRC*SIGNi,t + α16MCAP*SIGNi,t + α17MCAP*EBTP*SIGNi,t + α18TRC*EBTP*SIGNi,t + α19SIGN*EBTPi,t + ɛi,t 
Variable Description
The dependent variable is LLP. After controlling for non-discretionary (NPL, LOAN, LLPt-1,) and discretionary influences on LLP (EBTP, SIGN, MCAP), the variables of interest in the main regression are IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN. Non-discretionary variables employed are non-performing loans, beginning loan loss provision (LLPt-i), ratio of loans and advances to customers divided by total bank total asset (LOAN). These variables explain external factors beyond managerial control that have an influence on LLP. This is consistent with prior studies (Ahmed et al, 1999; Hasan and Wall, 2004; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzàles, 2008) . NPL controls for non-discretionary influence on specific provisions while LOAN controls for general reserves. A positive sign is expected because when banks predict that loan will go bad, they would increase provision, accordingly. Also, a positive sign is expected on LOAN variable. LLPt-1 should have a negative sign. It follows the reasoning that when banks increase provisions in the previous period, provisions for the current period is unlikely to increase proportionately.
Discretionary influences on LLP include EBTP, MCAP and SIGN variable. Using the EBTP variable to
indicate smoothing is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Ahmed et al, 1999; Anandarajan, 2007; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzàles, 2008; Leventis, et al., 2011; Curcio and Hasan, 2013) . A positive sign on the coefficient indicates income smoothing, a negative sign indicates otherwise. Also, Ahmed et al. (1999) , Leventis, et al. (2011) and Curcio and Hasan (2013) A positive sign on EBTP*MCAP and EBTP*TRC indicates greater incentives to smooth income than to manage capital, and vice versa. A negative sign on TRC*SIGN and MCAP*SIGN indicates greater incentives to manage capital than to signal, and vice versa. GDPR tests whether LLP is procyclical with the business cycle. This is consistent with prior studies (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca and Gonzàlez, 2008; and, Curcio and Hasan, 2013) . A negative sign indicates LLP is procyclical, otherwise, positive. Size is expected to have a positive sign. It follows the reasoning that large banks tend to have larger loan portfolio and will tend to increase provision more. However, these conflicting signs are not statistically significant. Finally, for the entire sample period as shown in Table 3 , a significant positive correlation between LLP and POST is observed indicating that Basel capital regime, after the 2008 crisis, led to significant increase in loan loss provisioning among Nigerian banks. 
Discussion of Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Main Regression Result
First, to test that the sign on the coefficients are consistent with theoretical expectations, I regress LLP with discretionary and non-discretionary variables, IFRS and POST. I exclude all interactive variables.
Regression 1, show that all variables are consistent with theoretical expectations except SIZE and LOAN.
Second, to examine the impact of IFRS on EBTP and SIGN, I introduce two interactive variables, IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN. Regression 2 show a significant positive coefficient for IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN at the 1% and 10% significance level, respectively. The support for smoothing and signaling hypothesis is significant after the inclusion of the interactive IFRS variables. Also, I find a significant positive sign on the POST coefficient and a significant negative sign on the IFRS dummy variable which suggests that regulators emphasize increased bank provisioning while the IFRS tend to discourage aggressive provisioning for transparency concerns. This is consistent with theory. Table 3 reports the robustness analysis. First, I divide the period into pre-crisis ( quality. This is indicated by the significant negative sign on the MCAP*SIGN coefficient (-1.73, α=10%).
Robustness Test
Interestingly, I find strong evidence that banks in Nigeria seem to have no incentive to jointly smooth income and signal loan quality. This is inferred from SIGN*EBTP (-3.68, α=1%) 
Conclusion
Consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999) , it is important for regulators to understand accrual-based accounting numbers used by bank managers to influence reported earnings, as well as, bank capital. The findings in this study is the first to provide evidence for smoothing, signaling and capital management via LLP in Nigeria. Ahmed et al. (2014) 
